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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY

The Fourth Circuit Summary provides a summary of
prevailing environmental decisions decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit since the last
issue of the William and MaryEnvironmentalLaw and Policy
Review. It does not cover every environmental decision of the
Fourth Circuit during that time period, but only those cases
which the editors believe to be of the most interest to our
subscribers.
RCRA
Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996).
The Cavallos were residential property owners in Fairfax County,
Virginia, living less than a mile from a petroleum distribution terminal
operated by Star Enterprise. On September 14, 1990, Star Enterprise
acknowledged that a large amount of aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and gasoline
had leaked into the soil and ground water. An additional spill occurred on
December 9, 1991. The Cavallos claimed that since the second spill they
have been continually exposed to vapors in their home. The Virginia State
Water Board investigated after the first spill and requested the Environmental
Protection Agency to assume responsibility, which it did, pursuant to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. EPA and Star Enterprise
negotiated an Administrative Consent Order requiring Star Enterprise to
implement corrective measures under EPA supervision. EPA then assumed
control of the remediation efforts on July 3, 1991.
The Cavallos brought suit against Star Enterprise in the Eastern
District of Virginia for damages associated with the 1990 and 1991 spills. In
their complaint, the Cavallos alleged four causes of action: (1) "Negligence
with Respect to AVJet Fuel Spill"; (2) "Negligent Petroleum Release and
Negligent Abatement and Remediation of the Petroleum Release"; (3)
"Common Law Trespass"; and (4) "Liability Under the State Water Control
Law." The district court granted summary judgment on Count I, and
determined that Counts II through IV were barred by statutes of limitation
and the federal preemption doctrine.
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of counts II, IV, and the
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portion of count III containing a loss of enjoyment claim. Under Adams v.
Star Enterprise, 51 F.3d 417, 422-23 (4th Cir. 1995), recovery is only
permitted under Virginia law if "the activity or condition complained of was
actually physically perceptible from the plaintiftfs'] property." In this case,
the smell of the vapors was physically perceptible from the Cavallo's
property.
The court upheld the dismissal of the portion of Count III containing
the personal injury claim. Citing Foley v. Harris,286 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 1982),
the court stated that because "the discomfort and annoyance must be
significant and of a kind that would be suffered by a normal person in the
community" and because Mrs. Cavallo alleged specifically that she was
highly susceptible to petroleum vapors, the claim was not cognizable under
Virginia law and was properly dismissed by the district court.
Turning to the issue of federal preemption, the court determined that
although the district court was correct that Star Enterprise could not be held
liable for remediation activities in conformity with the EPA orders, "the fact
that allegedly tortious conduct occurred within the... scope of an EPA order
does not necessarily compel preemption of a damages claim based on that
conduct." The court also held that damages claims conflict with EPA orders
only if the activities (a) were required, directed, or supervised by EPA, and
(b) were performed properly. Finally, the court concluded that the complaint
and the EPA orders were facially insufficient for a conclusive determination
of whether damages based on the activities would conflict with EPA
authority or in turn whether the preemption doctrine would apply, and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the first
count. The district court had concluded that the analytical methods used by
the Cavallo's expert witnesses were not sufficiently established to warrant
admission into evidence. Using an abuse of discretion standard the court of
appeals reviewed the decision to exclude the testimony and determined that
the trial court properly exercised its discretion consistent with the principles
set out in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,509 U.S. 579 (1993).
CLEAN AIR ACT/FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996).
Ormet Corporation, an aluminum manufacturer, appealed a district
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court dismissal of Ormet's action under the Clean Air Act ("CAA") against
Ohio Power Company. Ormet claimed a right to eighty-nine percent of the
emission allowances issued by EPA for Ohio Power's Kammer Generating
Station. Ormet claimed that, because it paid a proportionate share of the
Kammer plant's operating and maintenance costs, it was entitled, pursuant
to section 408(i) of the CAA, to its proportionate share of the emission
allowances issued for the Kammer plant. The court of appeals vacated and
remanded the district court's order dismissing Ormet's claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that the district court
had federal question jurisdiction over Ormet's claim, even though the CAA
does not create an implied private cause of action to adjudicate disputes over
emission allowances.
In 1957, Ormet entered into an agreement with Ohio Power in which
Ormet became the owner of two of three fossil fuel-fired units at the Kammer
plant. In 1966, the agreement was revised and a new contract was created
under which Ohio Power agreed to supply Ormet with electrical power and
Ormet agreed to pay for the Kammer plant's operating and maintenance costs
in proportion to the amount of power taken from the plant. In 1990, under
Title IV of the CAA Amendments of 1990, Ohio Power selected employees
of an affiliated company as a "designated representative" for obtaining and
administering an Acid Rain Permit, including holding the emission
allowances issued for the Kammer station. The designated representative
certified to EPA that Ohio Power was the sole owner of the Kammer plant
and thus, it alone was entitled to all of the allowances. On the basis of this
representation, EPA issued an Acid Rain Permit to Ohio Power for all of the
allowances.
Ormet sued Ohio Power in federal district court, claiming a right to
eighty-nine percent of the emission allowances issued for the Kammer plant.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that Ormet's suit involved a challenge of EPA's issuance
of the permit, which constituted a final agency action reviewable only by
United States courts of appeals under section 307 of the CAA.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
EPA's refusal to evaluate written comments submitted by Ormet to have the
certificate of representation amended to reflect Ormet's ownership interest
did not constitute final agency action and, therefore, the exclusive review
provision of section 307 did not apply. However, the court disagreed with
Ormet's contention that section 408(i) of the CAA created a private cause of
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action arising under federal law, creating federal question jurisdiction. The
c'oii't determined that Congress intended disagreements over the allocation
of emission allowances to be resolved by existing methods of dispute
resolution within the framework of commercial relationships, and not through
a private federal cause of action.
The court, however, held that although section 408(i) did not create
a private cause of action, the district court still had federal question
jurisdiction over Ormet's claim under the rationale set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Federal Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticalv.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). The court held that, because resolution of
the emission allowances dispute required the interpretation and application
of the CAA to the agreement between Ormet and Ohio Power, the dispute
implicated a substantial question of federal law that was sufficient to invoke
federal question jurisdiction under the standard established by the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
HAZARDOUS WASTE/DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Environmental Technology Council v. South Carolina, 98 F.3d 774 (4th
Cir. 1996).
South Carolina appealed a summary judgment granted by the district
court in favor of Environmental Technologies Council ("ETC"), which had
filed a lawsuit challenging a series of statutes, executive orders, and one
regulation, promulgated by South Carolina to limit the amount of hazardous
waste generated out-of-state and buried within South Carolina's borders. The
district court granted summary judgment after finding the South Carolina
laws violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and
permanently enjoined all provisions of those laws. The court of appeals
affirmed.
South Carolina has a number of large hazardous waste treatment and
disposal facilities within its borders. A considerable volume of hazardous
waste generated in other states enters the state each year for treatment and
disposal. In response to growing concerns of the volume of hazardous waste
entering the state, South Carolina took a series of measures to reduce this
inflow of waste. The first measure taken was a statutory blacklisting
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provision prohibiting entry into the state of certain out-of state wastes. The
second measure was a statute establishing annual limits on the amount of all
waste buried within the state. The statute also established a capacity floor for
waste generated in-state and a capacity ceiling for out-of-state waste. The
third measure imposed quota preferences for in-state wastes by providing a
fixed minimum capacity to be reserved for waste generated in-state and lower
limits on the maximum quantity of waste to be imported from any one state.
The fourth and final measure imposed an in-state needs requirement for all
permits to establish or expand hazardous waste treatment or storage facilities.
In 1985, EPA approved South Carolina's hazardous waste program
under RCRA despite the existence of a discriminatory fee imposed on waste
generated out-of-state. In 1990, EPA approved South Carolina's Capacity
Assurance Plan even though EPA expressed concern that the blacklisting
statutory provision was inconsistent with RCRA. Ultimately, in 1995, EPA
issued a notice that the agency intended to find that South Carolina's
hazardous waste program satisfied the requirements imposed by RCRA.
ETC successfully challenged the validity of the South Carolina laws in
federal district court.
On appeal, South Carolina raised four arguments. First, the state
argued that RCRA, CERCLA, and SARA override the dormant Commerce
Clause. The court of appeals, stating that a state law can only be removed
from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause if congressional intent to
authorize the discriminating law is "unmistakably clear" or "expressly
stated," found that these statutes did not contain any language permitting
states to burden interstate commerce. In addition, the court found that
Congress had not provided any "checkpoints" under RCRA, CERCLA, or
SARA, which authorized discrimination by South Carolina against other
states' hazardous waste.
In applying the dormant Commerce Clause to the South Carolina law,
the court used a two-tier analysis: (1) a per se rule of invalidity where a state
law discriminates facially in its practical effect or in its purpose, and (2) the
Pike balancing test which applies if a statute's burdens on commerce are
"clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits." The court held
that the
South Carolina laws clearly discriminated against out-of-state waste either
facially, in effect, or in purpose. The court found that South Carolina failed
to sufficiently demonstrate that the discriminatory treatment of out-of-state
waste was justified. All parts of the state's program were held to violate the
per se invalidity test.
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Finally, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to defer to the EPA for primary jurisdiction. The court
agreed with the district court's reasoning that the case was properly before an
Article III court because there were constitutional issues at stake and the
EPA's special expertise was not needed.

